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No Less Poetry Than Thought—On Werner Hamacher’s Philology 
 
In “WASEN: Um Celans Todtnauberg,” Werner Hamacher proposes to read Paul Celan’s 
poem as a “nicht weniger gedichtete als denkende Antwort,” a no less rhymed than reasoned 
response, to Martin Heidegger’s poetology.1 His close reading of Celan, together with his 
affirmation that poetry can think, is a powerful testament to Hamacher’s sense of the futility 
of holding on to the notion of a clear border between literature and philosophy. Indeed, in 
showing how poetry [Dichtung] thinks, in proposing Dichtung as the condition for 
understanding itself, Hamacher’s philology can be viewed as a response to––whom else?––
Plato. 
For Plato, there can be no philosophical understanding, or knowledge, without 
goodness. But what is goodness? Despite his brother Glaucon’s insistences, in Book VI of the 
Republic Socrates declares himself incapable of defining the Good. In lieu of a definition, he 
offers an analogy. The Good is, perhaps, like the sun. Just like the sun enables sight, so the 
Good “enables the objects of knowledge to be known by the mind.”2 And like the sun, the 
Good does not only facilitate perception but also allows things to come into being. The “sun 
gives to visible objects not only the power of being seen, but also their generation and growth 
and nourishment, not being itself generation.”3  Similarly, “you may say of the objects of 
knowledge that not only their being known comes from the good, but their existence and 
being also come from it, though the good is not itself being [epekeina tes ousias] but 
transcends even being in dignity and power.”4 Although A.D. Lindsay, the translator here, 
deviates from this, epekeina tes ousias is traditionally translated as “beyond being.”5 
According to Stanley Rosen, this “beyond being” can be read in two ways: either as 
suggesting that the Good does not exist at all, or that it exists beyond being.6 A third, more 
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interesting, option is to view the Good as “a member of the domain of genesis, the members 
of which wander between being and nonbeing.”7 The Good is, in fact, “liminal”: it allows 
being whilst not being part of being itself. In the end, Plato’s analogy of the sun is “too 
cryptic to be amenable to an entirely satisfactory explanation,” and Rosen settles on taking 
Socrates’ “beyond”, “in the metaphorical sense that it is neither this nor that of a separate and 
definable kind but is rather a property or set of properties of Platonic Ideas, namely, 
intelligibility, stability, and eternity.”8 
  A little further on in the Republic, these Platonic Ideas, or Forms, again become the 
object of analogy. With the analogy of the cave Plato argues that each particular, material 
object is, though seeming tangible and “real” to us, in fact a mere shadowy imitation of a 
single immaterial Form, the true Form. Considering Rosen’s remark on the liminal nature of 
“beyond being,” it is interesting that, as Julia Annas notes, both the analogy of the cave and 
the analogy of the sun “use light as a metaphor for truth,” whilst themselves “resist[ing] 
visual representation.”9 It is important to note, too, that whilst the image of the sun—fixed, 
removed, powerful—conveys the solidity Plato bestowed on his immaterial Forms, the 
varied, inconsistent, and contradictory nature of the shadows is no less due to the irregular 
surface of the cave wall then to the dangerous flickering of fire itself. Indeed, the shadows 
that the fire generates and throws onto the cave’s wall are, for Plato, only parasitic to the 
sun’s generative, but un-generated, Form. Whilst fire is changeable, it seems that the sun, like 
“the beautiful itself,” as Plato suggests in Phaedo, does not “admit any change 
whatsoever.”10 The generating power of light, that which, emanating from sun and fire, 
allows for shadows and sight,  is therefore duplicitous: it can both enlighten and mislead. 
 When Plato returns to the question of Form in Book X, in the context of the proposed 
banishment of all imitative poetry from the republic, he again does this through analogy. As 
in the case of the cave, the analogy of the bed differentiates between true Forms and 
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shadowy, inconsistent apparitions. Going further, Plato here differentiates not merely 
between Form and material objects, but between Forms, material objects and imitative art. 
Being an imitation of an imitation, a painting of a bed is, so Plato argues, thrice removed 
from the Form of the bed; it is thus even more shadowy and potentially more misleading than 
material objects themselves. The danger of the powers of an art that is, for Plato, in equal 
measure compelling and misleading becomes clear once the bed analogy is returned to its 
proper place in Plato’s critique of imitative poetry. Imitative poetry, such as that of Homer, is 
dangerous because, whilst its subject matter is ethical, “all poets…are imitators of images of 
virtue and all of the other subjects on which they write and do not lay of truth.”11 
How to square Plato’s expulsion of imitative poetry in the context of his suggestion in 
Book III that it can, at times, be beneficial? In the discussion of the role of literature in the 
guardians’ education across Books II and III, Plato overlooks his concern about the 
inherently problematic mimetic character of imitative poetry, as expressed in Book X, in 
order to concede that, if practised by a “man of measured character” (who by nature of his 
character would be able to discern good speech and action and only imitate that), imitative 
poetry can be useful for the guardians’ education.12 And how to reconcile the banishment of 
imitative poetry with Plato’s own use of analogy? Indeed, are not analogies fundamentally 
imitative? Are they not trading in shadowy forms, albeit for the “greater good” of gaining 
philosophical knowledge and understanding? 
More than anything, the Republic’s sun analogy is perhaps about the power of 
analogy itself: just like the sun allows things to be generated without itself being part of that 
generation, just like the Good allows knowledge and understanding to grow whilst still 
remaining beyond being, so the analogy of the sun facilitates philosophical understanding 
whilst itself remaining outside of the argumentative economy. Like the light of fire and sun, 
analogies can not only enlighten, but also obfuscate. For Rosen, Plato’s sun analogy is “too 
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cryptic” to facilitate an unequivocal reading. Similarly, Annas finds the sun and cave 
analogies “philosophically frustrating”, warning readers to be mindful of “Plato’s own 
warning on the limits of the kind of thinking that is guided by images and illustrations.”13 
This “poetic” thinking that analogy does, even if Plato’s own, is not to be trusted. Poieo 
means “to make, produce, first of something material, as manufacturers, works of art …,” 
“do,” but also “to bring about” or “cause.” What is it in the language of Plato’s analogy that 
brings about philosophical understanding or, indeed, frustration? What makes or produces 
this signifying force that can be used both to illuminate and confuse? What can produce 
meaning whilst itself escaping any conclusive interpretative or hermeneutic attempt? 
Whatever it is, this generating poetic force, which is not itself generation, is the object of 
what Werner Hamacher calls “philology.”  
Despite often finding himself at the nodal point of contemporary literary theory, 
Hamacher has long been an underrated figure. He studied first with Peter Szondi at the Freie 
Unversität zu Berlin, and then with Paul de Man in Paris, where he wrote his PhD on Hegel. 
Called to the chair of German literature at Johns Hopkins University in 1984, he returned to 
Germany as the chair of the newly founded Institute for General and Comparative Literature 
at the Goethe Universität Frankfurt in 1998. As a translator, for example of Lacan and de 
Man into German, and co-founder and long-time editor of the deeply influential Stanford 
University Press’ series Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, he facilitated the transition of texts 
and thoughts from one linguistic, geographic or disciplinary space into another. In doing so, 
he silently set the tone for his discipline. That the question of what precisely his discipline 
was remains a topic for debate reflects the productive liminality of Hamacher’s way of 
thinking. His obituaries call him a “poststructuralist”14, “German deconstructionist,” 
“Komparatist”15 and a “Literaturtheoretiker and Philologe.”16 Of these titles, there is, I 
believe, only one that Hamacher would have wholeheartedly embraced (or, at least, as 
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wholeheartedly as he was ever going to be able to—he, who increasingly tended to suspend 
his thinking, not in self-doubt, but in the suggestion that all thought, his first and foremost, 
was only ever a rough draft or sketch,): that of Philologe. Hamacher’s work engages with, to 
name just a few thinkers and authors, Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche, De Man, Schlegel, Kleist, 
Benjamin, Kafka, and Celan. In these encounters (because his texts are at heart reading 
events), Hamacher was, perhaps more than any other theorist, comparatist, or “philologist” of 
his generation, concerned with what accounts for the “performativity” of language. I shall 
term this its poietic force. We might call Hamacher a thinker and explorer of the fundamental 
conditions of language, but only if we understand these fundamentals to be themselves 
without foundation or, in Hart Nibbrig’s phrase, “bodenlos.”17 
 It is, thus, not surprising that we should find in Hamacher’s philological manifesto 
the formula with which Plato describes the power of the sun to generate without being 
generated—a formula that, as suggested above, also describes the conditions for the ability of 
analogy to produce and withdraw philosophical knowledge. Thesis 7 of his “Ninety-Five 
Theses for Philology” reads: 
 
The object of philology is – in extension and in intensity (reality), as well as in the 
intention directed toward it – infinite. It lies, as Plato might say, epékeinas tes ousías. 
It is therefore not an object of a representation or of a concept, but an idea. 18 
 
The object of Hamacher’s philology remains “beyond being.” Applying Rosen’s three 
possible readings to Thesis 7, we would have to choose between deciding that the object of 
his philology does not exist, that it exists “in some higher realm,” or that, it facilitates 
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passages from the former to the latter, remaining between non-being and being (“beyond 
being”).  
I will argue that the textual graft of the Platonic epekeina tes ousias in Thesis 7 of 
“Ninety-Five Theses for Philology” does two things. First, it suggests that Hamacher’s 
“philology” is concerned with poietic force, (with, for example, what in Plato’s use of 
analogy in the Republic generates meanings without itself being generated). Second, that 
when thinking about philology with Hamacher, we must take epekeina tes ousias literally as 
the place where such poietic power must be located. It means that, on the traces of 
Hamacher’s philology, we must turn our attention to moments of silence or interruption. It is 
precisely this that I do in this article. 
I begin by attending to a conversation of sorts between Hamacher and Jacques 
Derrida across a number of texts: Specters of Marx, Hamacher’s response “Lingua Amissa,” 
the closely “Afformative, Strike” and Derrida’s gesture towards Hamacher in “Marx & 
Sons.” As I show, this exchange is traversed by moments of silence in which Hamacher 
moves subtly, but decisively, away from Derrida. In this section, I thus begin to counter the 
view of Hamacher’s philology as mostly derivative of Derrida’s way of looking at texts. 
Through close engagements with “Ninety-Five Theses” and Premises in particular, the 
second section considers Hamacher’s critical creative problematisation of moments of silence 
or interruption as what (though remaining itself “beyond being”) lends language its poietic 
force.  In the final section, I turn to Hamacher’s engagement with Benjamin, in for example 
“Intensive Langauges” and his reading of Celan’s “Meridian,” in order to suggest that for 
Hamacher the silent condition of language itself is Dichtung, or poetry. By way of 
conclusion, I return to Hamacher’s reading of Plato to suggest that philosophy’s 




 “what Hamacher here says about and does with what ... I called the ‘perverformative’” 
 
In Specters of Marx, Derrida falls back on the same phrase Plato uses to characterise the 
generating but ungenerated power of the Good to describe the phenomenal oscillation of the 
ghost of Hamlet’s father in Shakespeare’s play: “visibility” itself, like audibility itself, is “by 
its essence” not seen, “which is why it remains epekeina tes ousias, beyond the phenomenon 
or beyond being.”19 Derrida is here not merely speaking of the spectral character of the 
father’s apparition in the play, he is also, not unlike Plato, raising the question of what power 
poiesis (Shakespeare’s in this case) can have for philosophical argument. Like the ghost does 
in Hamlet, the syncopating appearance/disappearance of Hamlet in Specters disrupts 
linearity. Like Plato’s use of analogy, it complicates the possibility of a straightforward 
philosophical reading. Derrida’s reading of Hamlet with Marx is, in fact, an example of what 
he calls performative interpretation. In other words, it is a reading which brings about not 
merely philosophical knowledge but also, potentially, political change.   
 Hamacher’s response to Specters deals at a very fundamental level with the 
conditions of such performative interpretation. “Lingua Amissa: The Messianism of 
Commodity-Language and Derrida’s Specters of Marx,” opens with the question of what 
language Marx may be using to speak about commodity language. “One must presume,” he 
writes, that Marx “speaks … two languages: the language in which the cloth expresses itself, 
weaves itself and joins with comparable fabrics, and another language which speaks about 
and beyond that cloth-language, loosens its weave, analyzes its relation to other, loosened 
weavings, entangling it in another categorical wrap.”20 In order not to remain under the spell 
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of the very economy it seeks to criticise, Marx’s language must “fulfil at least one condition 
which cannot be filled by the language of cloth”.21 The language with which Marx speaks of 
cloth-language must then in some sense be “beyond” it. It is in this “beyond” that 
Hamacher’s answer to Plato lies. 
“Lingua Amissa” is the only text in Ghostly Demarcations, a collection of essays on 
Specters, which Derrida singles out for praise: 
 
Because I find myself in close agreement with Hamacher, and am prepared to follow 
him down all the paths he thus opens up, I can do no more here than pay him simple, 
grateful homage. (Thus there is, despite appearances, nothing paradoxical about the 
fact that I say very little about his essay here, contenting myself with inviting the 
reader to read and reread it while weighing its every word.)22  
 
This is a chapeau in Hamacher’s direction just as much as it is a postponement of a serious 
engagement and thus, essentially, a silencing. The silence is, of course, not absolute. Derrida 
points us towards Hamacher’s work on the performative: “what Hamacher here says about 
and does with what ... I called the ‘perverformative’” is “one of the many luminous, powerful 
gestures of his interpretation, in a text that is impressive, admirable and original.”23 As 
Derrida’s phrasing suggests, Hamacher does not adopt his notion of the perverformative but 
does something with—and perhaps also something against or beyond?—it.  
What, then, is Derrida’s “perverformative” and what does Hamacher do with it? 
Specters testifies to the fact that Derrida is not only an avid practitioner of performative 
interpretation, but that he is also concerned with querying or qualifying the performative: 
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for a long time [I have] been attempting to transform the theory of the performative 
from within, to deconstruct it, which is to say, to overdetermine the theory itself, to 
put it to work in a different way, within a different ‘logic’—by challenging, here 
again, a certain ‘ontology’, a value of full presence ....24  
 
This ongoing transformation depends on a radical fissuring of “ontology,” the avowal of 
différance. Derrida’s querying of the performative is, therefore, anchored in his 
understanding of what fundamentally conditions it—namely, on what may be called 
différance, or “the trace of writing,” or the formation of form. Perhaps more ultra than contra 
Austin, Derrida rethinks speech act theory, taking différance into consideration. It is because 
of this that in “Envois” Derrida substitutes the word performative with perverformative.25 
Against a Searlian reading of Austin, Derrida insists that, regardless of the intentions of the 
speaker, what a performative ultimately achieves is incalculable. Like the missals of 
Derrida’s “Envois,” their sender and addressee remain opaque; like Poe’s purloined letter its 
trajectory is never directed but always winding [vertere] and thus perverted. In short, the 
performative is subject to what The Post Card calls the PP, the postal principle. It is 
noteworthy that, in The Postcard’s second text—“To Speculate – on Freud”—the PP also 
stands for the pépé, the grandfather Freud who observes his grandson Ernst throw and gather 
a little spool whilst saying fort! [ ] da!, the same words used by Derrida to punctuate the 
enter/exit of Hamlet’s ghost in his book on Marx. 
For Hamacher, the problem with speech act theory, Derrida’s included, is that it 
cannot account for the “performativity” of its performatives.  In order to see what Hamacher 
does with Derrida’s perverformative we must turn to an earlier piece, “Afformative, Strike”, 
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that Hamacher had written about Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence.” In “Critique of 
Violence,” Benjamin is not out to criticise violence—indeed for him the problem lies in 
distinguishing between good and bad, justified and unjustified violence in the first place—but 
to reclaim violence as “pure means.” Such “pure means” are to be found not only in the 
proletarian strike which is the focus of Benjamin’s analysis, but also, so Hamacher suggests 
in “Afformative, Strike,” in language: “Like language, the strike as pure means would be 
non-violent, neither coercion nor extortion, neither instrument nor the anticipation of 
transformed power relations, but, in its sheer mediacy, the overthrow itself.”26 Introducing 
the neologism of the “afformative” Hamacher disrupts speech act theory by arguing that  
there is just such “sheer mediacy,” “pure means,” and “overthrow itself” in language itself:  
 
I have already indicated that the series afformation, afformance, and afformative was 
formed in contrast to performation, performance, and performative; similarly, the use 
of afformative event is to contrast with the use of performative act – implying that 
affirmatives are not a subcategory of performatives. Rather, afformative, or pure, 
violence, is a “condition” for any instrumental, performative violence, and, at the 
same time, a condition which suspends their fulfilment in principle. But while 
afformations do not belong to the class of acts – that is, to the class of positing or 
founding operations – they are, nevertheless, never simply outside the sphere of acts 
or without relation to that sphere. The fact that afformations allow something to 
happen without making it happen has a dual significance: first, that they let this thing 
enter into the realm of positings, from which they themselves are excluded; and, 
second, that they are not what shows in the realm of positings, so that the field of 
phenomenality, as the field of positive manifestation can only indicate the effects of 
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the afformative as ellipses, pauses, interruptions, displacements, etc., but can never 
contain or include them. 27 
 
The afformative as what makes the performative, and hence also performative speech acts, 
possible, is closely connected to Benjamin’s notion of “pure violence” or “pure means.” And 
just as pure violence “decays in its positing,” so the afformative vanishes as soon as it has 
inaugurated the performative.28 Indeed, throughout the passage, Hamacher’s discussion of the 
afformative stands in close correspondence to the terms Plato’s Socrates uses to describe the 
“beyond being” of Forms: the afformative does not “belong to the class of [speech] acts,” 
they are still “in relation to them,” they allow entrance into “the realm of positings” without 
themselves being part of them, or vice versa. Indeed, “in the field of phenomenality” they can 
only appear as an absence of perception. He concludes: “the afformative is the ellipsis which 
silently accompanies any act and which may silently interrupt any speech act.” 29 Let us 




“the fundamental aporia – the aporia of positing, of founding itself.”30  
 
Something intervenes between thesis forty-eight and thesis forty-nine in Hamacher’s 
“Ninety-Five Theses on Philology”—a caesura, perhaps.31 It interferes at 48, Hamacher’s 
year of birth. It interferes between a thesis about the fact that language’s ability to speak is 
located in its ability “to speak in the absence of meaning,” its ability to be expressionless 
perhaps, and a thesis which asks us to listen with “a philologist’s ear,” an ear which would 
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precisely enable us to listen to this silent speaking of, or in, language.32 Every thinking of 
what posits without ever being itself posited, must, it seems, dwell in the absolute silence or 
emptiness of thesis forty-eight. And every thinking of thesis forty-eight in terms of silence, 
absence, pause or break must at the same time be a rethinking of silence, absence, pause or 
break. We are here not simply dealing with a lack, but rather with something more 
interfering, eloquent, unsettling, and also abiding and unchanging. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen has noted that “Hamacher’s works constitute perhaps the most 
powerful contemporary attempt to delineate and interrogate [the] aporetic structure, by which 
language, in its classical philosophical and theoretical elaboration, is simultaneously 
constructed and effaced, identified as such and destituted of all propriety.”33 This 
investigation into this fundamental “aporetic structure” takes Hamacher, as Heller-Roazen 
shows, to language, but, as I suggest, also to the poietic beyond language that is poetry or 
Dichtung. It is true that a rethinking of language is central to Hamacher’s work, and yet 
something always interferes when he thinks about language. These interferences are, I show, 
both objects of Hamacher’s philology, as well as expressions of it. 
Much of his writing, like thesis forty-eight, homes in on what makes language 
possible, what allows it to speak, to be language. When in “Lingua Amissa,” for example, 
Hamacher speaks about “commodity-language,” he does not speak of a particular type of 
commodity, which “in addition, [is] endowed with a particular language”; he is rather 
thinking about what in language allows commodities to be commodities, what about language 
allows language to be language.34 His discussion of commodity-language thus reveals that 
commodities, as well as language, owe their capabilities to what he calls the promise of 
language. The promise of language works both ways: it denotes both language’s ability to 
promise and language’s dependence on the act of promising. The promise is not merely an 
ability of language: rather, it is its very possibility. Not merely promises, but even more 
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“thetic or constative” uses of language only work as promises, remaining fundamentally and 
structurally “unfulfilled.”35 Put differently, “language is only language at all in view of a 
future language.”36 “Language,” Hamacher writes also in “Lingua Amissa,” “is nothing but 
this unfulfillable, unrealizable promise of language.”37 Promising is, in other words, not 
something that language does but what does language. “Intensive Languages,” a reading of, 
amongst other texts, Benjamin’s work on translation, similarly homes in on what makes 
language language. But here the talk is not of commodity-language or the promise of 
language, but of language’s “translatability.”38 And like commodity-language, translatability 
is described not as a secondary, subsequent capability of language, but as what, lying 
structurally at its heart, so to say, lends it its capability in the first place.39 Like the promise of 
language, translatability is never itself posited, is never described as there; it is rather 
understood as the “demand for another language.”40 Again, what makes language language, 
this other language, is described as athetic, “unfulfillable” and “unrealizable.”41 Perhaps the 
object of Hamacher philology is not language at all. 
 In Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida speaks of the promise along similar lines as 
the ones just sketched out. Like Hamacher and de Man, Derrida believes that “an immanent 
structure of promise […] informs all speech”42:   
 
Each time I open my mouth, each time I speak or write, I promise. Whether I like it or 
not: here, the fatal precipitation of the promise must be dissociated from the values of 
the will, intention, or meaning-to-say that are reasonably attached to it. The 
performative of this promise is not one speech among others. It is implied by any 
other performative, and this promise heralds the uniqueness of a language to come.”43 
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In contrast to Hamacher for whom the promise of language is in itself the foundational 
operation of language, for Derrida this promise is itself subject to différance:  
 
This appeal to come [appel á venir] gathers language together in advance. It 
welcomes it, collects it, not in its identity or its unity, not even in its ipseity, but in the 
uniqueness or singularity of a gathering together its difference to itself: in difference 
with itself [avec soi] rather than difference from itself [d’avec soi].44  
 
In this view, for a promise to be a promise it itself needs to escape positing, it must 
“allo[w] itself to be haunted by the possibility, of its perversion.”45 It is important to note that 
for Hamacher the promise of language, just as its translatability, is not merely presented as 
what makes every statement athetic, but is conceived of as athetic itself. At the most 
fundamental level, Hamacher’s discussion of commodity language in “Lingua Amissa,” as 
well as his discussion of translatability in “Intensive Languages,” deals with this foundational 
and yet unfulfilled possibility: this is what the Introduction to Premises calls “the 
fundamental aporia – the aporia of positing, of founding itself.”46  
This is the “aporetic structure” which, as Heller-Roazen has justly argued, lies at the 
heart of Hamacher’s contribution. For Heller-Roazen, however, it is a contribution not 
dissimilar to Derrida’s, for whom, he writes in his own translation of Marges, “the 
impossibility of the copresence and simulatenity of the ‘nows’ is what makes the present 
actually present as such.”47 In this account the “aporetic structure” prominent in Hamacher’s 
work is congruent with a Derridean understanding of “an original difference,” despite Heller-
Roazen’s later claim that “Hamacher … displaced Derrida’s problematic onto a terrain that is 
altogether its own,” because it presents différance’s timing and spacing as “operations of 
reading and writing,” and thus “irreducibly tied to language and its occurrence.”48 It is true 
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that Hamacher’s oeuvre gives a more prominent place to language than Derrida’s, but it is 
mistaken, I consider, to suggest that for Derrida différance is not already understood also in 
terms of language. The difference between Hamacher and Derrida lies not in the fact that one 
understands the aporia of positing as a function of language and the other does not; for both, 
what posits language, as well as everything else, is posited by what escapes all positing. What 
would we call…this thing? 
A Derridean différance, even if linguistically transposed, is not what Hamacher’s idea 
(that what posits the athetic must itself be athetic) amounts to:  
 
A positing that is supposed to be unconditioned must be a positing without 
presupposition and thus a subjectless positing. It must purely posit itself; but by 
positing itself, it already posits itself, and so the positing that it is first supposed to 
perform must already allow itself to be presupposed. But such an allowance, 
admission, or concession of a presupposition can no longer be thought according to 
the logic of positing. It must be other than a presupposition and other than a positing 
of a prior support; on the contrary, in the very act of positing it must be precisely the 
opening that remains independent of the positing, an opening onto another that itself 
withdraws from the power, the faculty, and the possibility of positing. But if positing 
can be a positing only by allowing something other than itself—other than its thetic 
Being—then an original positing cannot be performed. It is in need of a difference 
with respect to itself that can under no condition be reduced to a thetic act.49 
 
Positing can, precisely because it posits, not be posited itself. Such a pre-positing, for lack of 
a better term, cannot be thought of in terms of an antecedent positing. It has to be, Hamacher 
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writes, an opening that together with what it makes possible withdraws from positing. It is 
precisely because positing can only posit itself, insofar as it allows or lets in something 
other—and something other than a thetical being—that we cannot think it in terms of an 
originary positing, indeed in terms of positing at all. It is not, but it also is not. It is not 
merely the absence of something, but the absence of something other than a thetical being; in 
fact it is not even the absence of an athetical being, it’s, perhaps, a question of aa dynamic of 
diminuendo and crescendo towards and within it.  This also does not mean that positing does 
not happen. Something posits, or something is posited, albeit always-not-quite. Considering 
the prominence attributed to Hamacher’s interventions into our concept of language in the 
reception of his work so far, it is important to note that he does not exclusively think about 
this aporia of positing in terms of language, or even in terms of a non-language.50 Like 
translatability or commodity-language, the afformative here is not a subcategory of the 
capability it describes, but what athetically posits its possibility in the first place. In Premises, 
the motif of the aporia of positing sets the tone for Hamacher’s attempt to understand 
understanding itself, precisely as a not-understanding.51 In the untranslatable “Fragen und 
Keine. Philosophy,” it is put in motion to think the question and to think philosophy.52  
It is of course impossible to abstract any one master term, such as the “aporetic 
structure” of positing, from Hamacher’s readerly encounters with other philosophical or 
literary texts. Because, of course, this is what his writings fundamentally are—readings. As 
Hamacher writes in “Lectio: De Mans Imperative,” “the language of reading is therefore 
another language, perhaps something other than language, in any case a ‘language’ that does 
not manage without a distancing through quotation marks: a ‘language’ ‘of’ ‘language’.” His 
work, therefore, partakes in a mode of thinking that does not easily lend itself to a distillation 
of a central or fundamental tenet.53 Hamacher, in fact, never posits the central tenet of his 
thought. This perhaps becomes most clear in the mercurial nature of his critical vocabulary, 
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in the flexibility with which he is prepared to tackle a question or problem from different 
positions even within the same text. Hamacher’s is not a philosophy that delivers answers to 
questions, as we are also given to understand in “Fragen und Keine. Philosophie,” a “rough 
draft” text posing non-question after non-question to think about how and what philosophy 
asks. (It is worth noting that this is a text that has been rewritten from scratch for the second 
edition of the edited volume in which it was first published.) As with “Fragen,” many of 
Hamacher’s texts always retain their sketch-like character; they strike me as movable, 
flexible things, always about to shape-shift. The aporetic is, in this sense, not merely the 
subject but also the character or his thought.  
And yet, all these different modulations on the aporia of positing are, it seems, in 
silent conversation with Plato’s epekeina tes ousias. In “Lectio: De Mans Imperative,” 
Hamacher speaks of “die sprachliche Grundoperation des Versprechens der Sprache”, or “the 
basic linguistic operation of understanding [promising] language.”54 Promising is the 
Grundoperation of language, and because it is a “basic linguistic operation,” it is itself made 
of language. What makes language possible is still language and yet—as “Lingua Amissa” 
and “Ninety-Five Theses” make clear—it is also still not language. “Lingua Amissa” calls it 
“not, perhaps, a talking thing, perhaps a thing which does not—or does not simply—speak, 
something which, still unspeaking, nonetheless promises itself a language in advance of 
itself—.”55 What makes language possible is thus neither language nor something understood 
in terms of language. It must be altogether non-thetical and non-posited and thus cannot for 
its expression rely on something that is nameable or even thinkable.  
What is at matter here, Heller-Roazen is right to point out, is “the rest of language.”56 
“The rest of” is something that exceeds, that is left over. It is also something that rests, that 
lies and remains still. The rest of language is something which, being “irreducible to 
meaning,” remains silent.57 In a de Manian sense, the “basic linguistic operation” is not 
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merely a promising [versprechen] but also a ver-sprechen, a slip of the tongue, a lapse, a 
pause, a silence. It is, in this vein, significant that “Intensive Languages” concludes by 
speaking of and towards an athetical “linguistic being ... as ex-position: orphaning, 
externalization, singularization, stoppage, pause.”58 And this stoppage or pause in or of 
language has everything to do with a sort of giving up of language. It is a surrender of 
language that “Ninety-Five Theses” describes as a giving and withdrawing of and in and 
therefore not by language: “It is language that gives (itself) and language that withdraws 
(itself, this giving).”59 This same surrender of language is also performed in the title of 
“Hamacher’s “Lingua Amissa.” The phrase Lingua a-missa plays on the homophones 
between the past participle passive of the Latin verb amittere (to lose) and the past participle 
passive of the Latin verb mittere (to send) with an alpha privativum. Lingua amissa thus 
means both a language that has not been sent and a language that has been lost, that has been 
let go [aus-lassen], perhaps even a language of omission [auslassen], of falling silent. 
“Lectio” similarly speaks of a lapsus linguae as not merely the ground of language but also 
of theory: “The ‘ground’ of language, of understanding, of literary scholarship is—a 
lapsus.”60 Like in “Fragen und Keine. Philosophie” auslassen is here both an aus-lassen, an 
allowing, as well as an auslassen, an ommission.61  
In Hamacher’s work the interruption of language is not merely thought about, it is 
performed. I, of course, started with one example of such a performance: the second, silent 
forty-eighth thesis of “Ninety-Five Theses.” If we listen closely we can also hear the 
interruption in the break—marked by a comma—between afformative and strike in 
“Afformative, Strike.” Another example of this is the full stop in “Fragen und Keine. 
Philosophie.” What is at stake in Hamacher’s thinking of “the aporia of positing, of founding 
itself” is not merely a non-language, or a language of nothing, but a moment of silence, a 
moment which transposes the “beyond being” to the ear. 
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 “Dichtung ist die erste Philologie” 62  
 
For Hamacher, the silent interruption of the afformative is not simple. One could think it in 
terms of what Hamacher calls the “self-contraction of absence” in “The Second of Inversion: 
Movements of a Figure through Celan’s Poetry”.63 If this not-yet-and-still-not had a shape, it 
would be that of prolepsis because it strives towards that which underlies it; and it would be 
one of pro-lapsus, a slippage, a fall, because what underlies it is not there—it is itself the 
lapsus, pause, silence.64 One could, in this sense, not merely not think of the foundational 
aporia in terms of a simple silence, or as something that interrupts. In “Intensive Languages” 
Hamacher, in fact, speaks of what makes language possible not as something which 
interrupts, but rather as what is itself interrupted: “This saying, which speaks alongside 
[mitspricht] in all expression, is itself what is sayable in no expression: language speaks or 
languages [die Sprache spricht] only from out of the expressionless and into it.”65 In this 
view, then, what speaks alongside every expression, but which is itself not sayable is not 
what interrupts language, but what makes language possible: language emerges out of it. 
What makes the positing of language and every other positing possible is, very much 
along lines traced by Benjamin, thought of not as a break that interrupts language, for 
example, but as an unthinkable continuum out of which it emerges:  
 
Benjamin ... concludes from the aporia of the linguistic continuum that the continuum 
of language is to be founded in the caesura, according to his study of Hölderlin or in 
the expressionless according to the translation essay and a little later in the piece on 
elective affinities. Where no ground can be found in the continuum, the 
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expressionless and the caesura offer foundations for the dissolution of the solution, 
the deliverance of the continuum in its discontinuity.66  
 
The continuum of language, that which posits, is founded in what is itself without foundation: 
this is what in Benjamin’s study of Hölderlin is called “caesura” and what in his essay on 
Goethe’s Elective Affinities is called the expressionless or the Ausdruckslose. Benjamin finds 
two examples of the Ausdruckslose in Goethe’s novel: first “the interpolated novella that 
appears in the middle of the second volume under the title ‘The Strange Neighbour 
Children’”; the second is a sentence—“Hope, like a star falling from heaven, soared above 
their heads and away”—that marks the last possible moment in which the lover Ottilie and 
Eduard may be united.67 Although taking form in his reading of Goethe, Benjamin’s 
Ausdruckslose originates in Hölderlin (again, displacement): 
 
As a category of language and art and not of the work or of the genres, the 
expressionless can be no more rigorously defined than through a passage in 
Hölderlin’s Anmerkungen zum Ödipus [Annotation to Oedipus]. The passage reads: 
“For the tragic transport is actually empty, and the least restrained.—Thereby, in the 
rhythmic sequence of the representation wherein the transport presents itself, there 
becomes necessary what in poetic meter is called caesura, the pure word, the counter-
rhythmic rupture—namely, in order to meet the onrushing change of representations 
at its highest points, in such a manner that not the change of representation but the 
representation itself very soon appears.68 
 
Although Hölderlin speaks of the Ausdruckslose in terms of language itself, his is an 
understanding of language that is inextricably connected to a particular idea of poetry, or, 
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rather, Dichtung. In fact, for Hölderlin, the expressionless is a category of language and of art 
itself. In other words, a description of the Ausdruckslose only in terms of language is 
insufficient. And although, for Hölderlin, “caesura” interrupts poetry or Dichtung, in other 
parts of Hamacher’s work—particularly in his readings of Celan—the silence of “caesura” 
becomes the dwelling place for something like Dichtung itself. 
In “Fragen und Keine. Philosophie”, Hamacher writes, “Sprechen wir während der 
Ebbe des Sprachmeers. Bewegen wir uns, sprechen in Watt. Sprechen wir Watt.”69 “Do we 
speak during the low tide of the sea of language. Do we move, do we speak in the mud flats. 
Do we speak mud flats.” My translation is inadequate not merely because it is impossible to 
render the conditional, grammatical effect of the question-mark-less-interrogative of 
Hamacher’s German. “Watt” is the German word for mud flats; it is, however, also the title 
of Samuel Beckett’s novel about the failing of language. Beckett’s contribution to a thinking 
of the failing of language is, in fact, less cryptically marked in thesis forty-seven when 
Hamacher draws, still rather elliptically, on Dionysus, Maimonides and Beckett to think the 
name with no name.70 Here, however, literature is not drawn on for its depiction of the failing 
of language, but is itself presented as what fails language and what make language and 
thinking possible.  
Yet, there is still more to this passage. What might seem to be a strange metaphor of 
the ebbing sea is in fact a Kantian echo, or, rather, a reversal of a Kantian image. For, in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant uses precisely the sea to illustrate the aesthetic 
judgement of the sublime. Whereas the sea can be thought of as an empirical object (in other 
words, a concrete thing doing a concrete action or serving a concrete purpose), Kant 
encourages us to 
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consider the ocean merely as the poets do, in accordance with what its appearance 
shows, for instance, when it is considered in periods of calm, as a clear mirror of 
water bounded only by the heavens, but also when it is turbulent an abyss threatening 
to devour everything, and yet still be able to find it sublime.71  
 
For McLaughlin, “this ability…to see the sea before it has been claimed as a 
substantial thing” is an example of poetic force which bears with itself the “’not’ of 
unforce.72 Hamacher’s insistence on mud flats, indicating not merely the absence of the sea, 
but also the condition of its appearance, characterizes poetic force in terms of such an 
unforce. Again, the terms of Hamacher’s discussion of poietic force echo Plato’s sense of 
beyond-beingness of the Forms. Like the continuum of language, “any absolute beauty” or 
“true being,” as Plato writes in Phaedo, does “never admit to any change whatsoever.”73 Like 
the light in the analogies of the sun and cave, the duplicity of water (implied in Hamacher’s 
echoing of the sea’s “clear mirror”, or “turbulent abyss”, as described by Kant in his image of 
mud-flats) refers us to the pure means of poietic force. 
 It is just these pure means of poietic force that Celan addresses in a moment of self-
interruption in “The Meridian”: 
 
But I do think—and this thought can hardly surprise you by now—I think that it had 
always been part of the poem’s hopes to speak on behalf of exactly this strange—no, I 
cannot use this word this way—exactly on another’s behalf—who knows, perhaps on 
behalf of a totally other. This “who knows,” to which I see that I have now arrived, is 
all I can add, here, today to the old hopes.74   
 
 24 
Before Celan can say what it is that poetry always hoped to speak of, there is an interruption 
and the sentence continues in a different direction, out of and into the unthinkable continuum. 
The poem cannot speak of it but only on its behalf. It is a speaking into and out of it, which is 
itself, being punctuated by a “who knows” and a “perhaps” athetic. All Celan can do is use 
Dichtung itself (“The Meridian” is, of course, nothing but a poem), to add to poetry’s old 
hopes.  
 Celan continues: “Das Gedicht verweilt oder verhofft—ein auf die Kreatur zu 
beziehendes Wort—bei solchen Gedanken.”75 This is how Pierre Joris translates this 
sentence: “The poem tarries and tests the wind—a word related to the creaturely—through 
such thoughts.”76 Hamacher picks up on this word “verhoffen” in his Celan essay in 
Premises, in order to speak of a dash or hyphen—again a moment of “caesura”—in one of 
Celan’s poems.  
  
If the nothing of language were not received and perceived, its inversion into being 
would not be possible. This possibility of the impossibility of its own existence breaks 
open in Celan’s poem only in the dash before the doch (yet), in the interruption of 
tropic language, in the mute hesitation of receiving and perceiving. This graphic 
pause—Celan later found for a similar moment the word verhoffen, as state of 
expectancy to which the alternatives of hope and despair do not apply, as in the alarm 
of animals when faced with a hunter—opens in poetic speaking a hole that cannot be 
closed by the logic of inversion; it opens a distance that cannot be transformed into a 
nearness, a difference that cannot turn into a unity, a mute site that cannot change into 
a topos of an eloquent image. This is the site of an absence that must still remain 




Verhoffen is difficult to translate. This may have been the reason why the English version of 
Hamacher’s text contains a definition of the word that the German version does not.78 
Verhoffen: a “state of expectancy to which the alternatives of hope and despair do not apply, 
as in the alarm of animals when faced with a hunter.” This is I think a better strategy of 
translating this word than Joris’s “tarries and tests the wind,” which loses out so much of 
what verhoffen does in Celan. Verhoffen comes from hunting language, indicating that 
moment when game stands still and listens in order to listen or to pick up a scent. Celan’s 
verhoffen, however, is also a ver-hoffen, a losing of hope [Hoffnung].79 In this view, Dichtung 
is an abiding in the presence of neither hope nor despair. It is, simply, an abiding out of 
which what is posited—language, for example, but also being—emerges. For Hamacher, 
Dichtung, poetic force itself, is “the aporia of positing, of founding.”80  
 
I have suggested that Dichtung is what remains epekeina tes ousias, that it becomes for 
Hamacher a quasi-metaphysical presence, or, rather, a quasi-metaphysical and continual 
withdrawal or subtraction from being.  If taken seriously, this suggestion would entail the all 
but disappearance of the ancient quarrel between literature and philosophy. When literature 
becomes not only the metier of critical inquiry, but when Dichtung as poietic force itself, as 
what generates without itself being generated, allows itself for thinking then philosophy does 
not merely need philology but it becomes it. As much is suggested in Hamacher’s brief 
account of Plato’s Phaedrus in “For – Philology.” Falling in love with language, with what in 
languages loves, Socrates becomes, Hamacher suggests, himself an aner philologicos, a man 
who thinks under the conditions of signification and thinking that philology investigates. 
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